By Frank Ledwidge, University of Portsmouth; The Conversation
FILE: Keir Starmer phones president-elect Donald Trump. (Photo: Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND)
The election of Donald Trump as US president puts the UK in a tricky position on many global issues. But even beyond concerns about Nato’s stability or the special relationship, the UK has serious internal defence issues to address.
British defence is at a critical point, with severe gaps in readiness and a lack of any clear strategy. Decades of limited funding, poor management and lack of direction have made reassessment essential. All of this stems from a chronic lack of clarity as to who the UK is geopolitically and what its armed forces are actually for.
Since 2014, when the last British combat troops left Afghanistan, there was no serious attempt to square the circle of ever-decreasing resources and personnel. The Ministry of Defence took a “do everything, everywhere all the time” approach termed persistent engagement, underwritten by an assumption that if push came to shove against Russia, the US would be there for us.
With a second Trump term looming, there is no time for such dilettantism. Ukraine is facing defeat and there is a serious risk of the US reallocating forces to confront China, leaving Europe (and the UK) somewhat bewildered as to what to do next.
The British armed forces face significant challenges. The British Army cannot deploy a full division — about 10,000 troops ready for combat. The Royal Air Force struggles to defend its airfields, especially against missile attack; the Royal Navy lacks enough crew for its remaining ships.
These shortfalls place the UK far from the ranks of leading militaries. All services suffer from chronic lack of ammunition and supplies. In the words of senior defence academic and former Ministry of Defence official, Rob Johnson, the UK Armed Forces are unprepared for “a conflict of any scale”.
Years of budget cuts, poor resource use and inconsistent leadership have brought us to this point. These issues make it clear that Britain is not meeting its Nato obligations to provide an aircraft carrier task group and two brigades of troops, a fact well understood within defence circles. In a report earlier this year the House of Commons Defence Committee found UK Armed Forces operational readiness to be in doubt.
Reassessing the nuclear deterrent
Trump’s re-election highlights Britain’s complete reliance on the US for its nuclear deterrent. In the words of the cross-party Trident commission as long ago as 2014, the entire programme is “a hostage to American goodwill” – despite claims that the deterrent is “independent”.
Although Trident is operationally controlled by the UK, the missiles and critical guidance systems are American and the submarines themselves are, to a great extent, reliant on US components.
This dependence raises doubts not only as to the degree of control the UK might have in extremis, but about its sustainability — especially if the US rethinks the arrangement. While there is no direct evidence that Trump is considering this, there is no guarantee that a subsequent isolationist administration would not consider such a close connection to a foreign power to be a bigger cost than benefit.
Regardless, a strong pragmatic argument can be made for cutting this particular Gordian knot now. The huge resources supporting it could be better used for building a defence force which would constitute a far more effective deterrent in a world of serious conventional threats in Europe.
Britain’s global role
A more urgent issue is Britain’s lack of a focused defence strategy. The UK must decide: is it a global power or a regional force in the Euro-Atlantic area? It cannot be both.
For 30 years, Britain has acted as a supporting player to the US, pursuing global goals without the means to sustain them.
This has been cloaked by ideas like “global Britain”, most recently echoed in the 2021 Integrated Review, elegantly written yet starry-eyed about military practicalities. Without concrete planning or resources, lofty ambitions like the now-retired idea of a “tilt to the Pacific” are hollow.
The Ukraine war accelerated the realisation that Britain would be better suited as a strong regional power than a weak global one. So it was in the 1980s when Britain focused on securing North Atlantic sea lanes and aiding European defence. A regional strategy would be more sustainable than trying to uphold “global Britain” without anything like the resources to back it.
The upcoming strategic defence review commissioned by the new Starmer government is a chance to address these core issues.
This review isn’t about adjusting budgets, it’s about defining Britain’s military purpose. Practically, it should address big questions, like the value of Britain’s nuclear deterrent and the role of its chronically unreliable aircraft carriers that currently lack support, adequate protection, sufficient crews or even, at times, aircraft.
The return of Trump makes it urgent to define Britain’s defence priorities. The UK must either commit to a robust, independent defence strategy or accept a more limited role influenced by US policy.
Frank Ledwidge, Senior Lecturer in Military Strategy and Law, University of Portsmouth
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
